The Proper Standard of Fault for Imposing Personal Liability on Corporate Directors for False or Misleading Statements in Proxy Solicitations Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 14a-9 by Schmids, Stephen Robert
THE PROPER STANDARD OF FAULT FOR IMPOSING PERSONAL LIABILITY
ON CORPORATE DIRECTORS FOR FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS
IN PROXY SOLICITATIONS UNDER SECTION 14(a) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND SEC RULE 14a-9
I. INTRODUCTION TO CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST
DIRECTORS UNDER SECTION 14(a) AND RULE 14a-9
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 provides for
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the solici-
tation of proxies to be voted at shareholder meetings. The section makes
it unlawful for any person to solicit or allow the use of his name to solicit
a proxy or consent with regard to any registered security in violation of
SEC rules and regulations. As part of the implementation of this section,
the SEC adopted rule 14a-9,2 which forbids proxy solicitations which con-
tain false or misleading statements of material facts, or which omit mate-
rial facts necessary to prevent statements made from being false or mislead-
ing. According to one team of commentators, "The federal legislation
and the Commission rules were enacted to place certain security holders
in the position they would occupy if they could attend shareholder meet-
ings and ask intelligent questions to which they would receive true and
complete answers.
' '3
Section 14 contains only a blanket prohibition of certain conduct and
does not provide for civil or criminal liability for violation of that prohibi-
115 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or
otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered
pursuant to section 781 of this title [Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1973), entitled "False or misleading statements," provides in per-
tinent part:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral,
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which
omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not
false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication
with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which
has become false or misleading.
The forerunner of Rule 14a-9 was Rule 14a-5, which was promulgated in 1938 under Reg.
X 14. The former rule was substantially the same as the present one, with the exception
of the present language requiring the correction of prior statements which was added in
1940, and a note added to the body of the rule in 1956, which lists examples of misleading
facts.
3 Sowards and Mofsky, Federal Proxy Regulations: Recent Extension of Controls, 41 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 165, 165-66 (1966).
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tion. However, since J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,4 a private right of action,
both direct and derivative, has been implied in § 14(a) for violation of
its provisions and of the rules and regulations implementing the section.
The Borak Court said, "Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides
a necessary supplement to Commission action. As in antitrust treble dam-
age litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves
as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements." 5
In most of the reported proxy cases prior to Borak only equitable relief
was sought, and the relief given was usually addressed to recirculating
the proxy materials or undoing the vote of the shareholders.' But the
Supreme Court made it clear in Borak that not only prospective relief,
but also all necessary remedial relief, including damages, could be awarded
by federal courts in § 14(a) actions.
There is no requirement under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
that the directors of a corporation sign proxy material, approve it, or even
see it, except in the case of a contested election to the board of directors.7
There are, however, several ways, other than by signing proxy statements,
in which directors can be exposed to liability for misstatements or omis-
sions in proxy materials. A director might, for instance, prepare proxy
materials or supervise their preparation, participate in solicitation of proxies
by the board of directors, or allow his name to be used in the solicitation
of proxies. Furthermore, if, as part of the management's solicitation, the
board of directors makes recommendations to the shareholders on questions
to be considered at the shareholder meeting, individual directors can be
found to be directly soliciting proxies for management unless they disas-
sociate themselves from the board's recommendations. 8 Many directors
are also corporate officers, and, as part of management, they may be direct
4 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
5 Id. at 432.
6 See, e.g., Gaudiosi v. Franklin, 166 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd and appeal
dismissed in part, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cit. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959); Butler
Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
aff'd, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971), arid,
453 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1971); Union Pacific R.R. v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 226 F.
Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
7 Rule 14a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1973).
81n Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D. Del. 1972), Chief
Judge Wright held that an outside director who had not disassociated himself from the reccom-
mendations of the board of directors contained in the proxy materials, was a participant
in the solicitation of proxies. According to Judge Wright:
The S..EC. regulations afford a dissenting director an opportunity to disassociate him-
self from the Board of Directors' recommendations, C.F.R. § 240.14a-101(3)(a)(1);
however, such disavowel [sic) must be made in the form of written notice to the Board.
Id. [The director] gave no such written notice, and, in fact, not only supported the
Board's recommendations, but also approved a draft form of the proxy materials. The
failure to effect such notice and to apprise the shareholders of any objections he had
to the proxy materials cast [the director] in the role of a person soliciting proxies on
behalf of management.
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participants in management's solicitation of proxies. Finally, under state
law, the board of directors may comprise the management of the corpora-
tion, and thus a solicitation of proxies by management would necessarily
involve the directors as participants unless the directors individually disas-
sociate themselves from the solicitation.9 In general then, a routine per-
formance of his duties can subject a director to liability for participation
in a proxy solicitation in which inadequate disclosure was made.
Although rule 14a-9 is often referred to as an anti-fraud rule, recovery
for violation of the rule can be had without proof of all the elements
of common law fraud or deceit.10 Specifically, there need be no reliance
by the individual plaintiff on the misrepresentation,11 nor intent on the
part of the defendant to induce the plaintiff to act or fail to act in reliance
on the misrepresentation. Nor need there even be any actual misrepresen-
tation of fact, since an omission of a material fact suffices to establish
liability if other statements are thereby made misleading or false. Section
14(a) and rule 14a-9 do not specify any requirement of scienter either,
while in common law deceit actions there is a requirement that the plaintiff
9 Under Delaware law, the board of directors comprises the management of the corporation
and is the sole body empowered to make proxy solicitations on behalf of management. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a), Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852
(Del. Ch. 1957). Thus, in the Gould case, supra note 8, the court would not accept the
director's contention that he was not a part of management and thus not a participant in
the management's solicitation of proxies. 351 F. Supp. at 858.
10 The elements of a common law cause of action for deceit are 1) a false representation,
ordinarily one of fact, made by the defendant, 2) knowledge or belief on the part of the
defendant that the representation is false or lack on the part of the defendant of a sufficient
basis of information to make the representation (this element is called "scienter"), 3) an
intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepre-
sentation, 4) justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in taking
action or refraining from it, and 5) damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
W. PROSSER, TORTs § 105 (4th ed. 1971).
In general, the elements of a cause of action based on a violation of section 14(a) and
rule 14a-9 are 1) a security registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act, 2) a solicitation
of proxies by the defendant or with the authorized use of his name, 3) use of false or
misleading statement(s) or omission(s) of facts resulting in statements being misleading or
false, 4) materiality of the facts misstated or omitted, 5) damage to plaintiff's interests, 6)
causal connection between the misstatement(s) or omission(s) and the injury to plaintiff's
interests, and 7) culpability or fault on the part of the defendant under the appropriate
standard of fault.
11 "It is unnecessary for a plaintiff to establish his particular reliance if it can be demonstrated
that the misrepresentation had a causative effect upon the vote of the stockholders as a group.
Reliance may be inferred from the effect unless the defendant proves otherwise." Gerstle
v. Gamble-Skogmo, 298 F. Supp. 66, 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). The need to show reliance
in 14a-9 actions appears to have been eliminated by the requirements that the misstatements
or omissions be of material facts (i.e., "that the defect was of such a character that it might
have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding
how to vote," Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 384) and that the proxy solicitation
itself be an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction for which proxies were
solicited. Reliance thus seems to be presumed once materiality and causation are shown.
At any rate, the Supreme Court in Mills declined to adopt any requirement that the misstate-
ment or omission be shown to have had a decisive effect on the shareholders' approval of
the transaction, which requirement, the Court noted, would correspond to the requirement
of reliance in common law fraud actions.
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establish that the defendant knew or believed that the representation was
in fact false, or that he at least had no grounds for making the representa-
tion."2 Because the two provisions are silent with respect to the require-
ment of scienter, the question of the proper standard of culpability often
arises, with plaintiffs contending that scienter is unnecessary and negligence
is sufficient,13 and defendants arguing (so far unsuccessfully) that a show-
ing of scienter is essential to a 14a-9 cause of action.'4 Some plaintiffs
have even contended that those soliciting proxies should be held strictly
liable for damages resulting from misstatements or omissions of material
facts,' 5 but thus far no court has held defendants to such a standard.
The primary controversy, the one with which this note is concerned,
has thus become whether negligence or scienter is the proper standard
for liability in actions against directors. However, since there may be con-
siderations present in the case of those corporate officials, including di-
rectors, who actually prepare the proxy materials, which might justify the
imposition of a higher standard of care on such officials, this note confines
itself to a consideration of only that standard appropriate for directors not
so involved.
II. NEGLIGENCE AND SCIENTER STANDARDS
IN RULE 14a-9 ACTIONS
By prohibiting misstatements and omissions of material facts in proxy
materials, rule 14a-9 imposes upon those soliciting proxies the duty to
disclose all facts which would normally tend to influence a reasonable
stockholder in voting on the proposal for which his proxy is sought."
The question of the proper standard for imposing liability on directors
under rule 14a-9 thus becomes a matter of determining at what point
directors have so far satisfied their duty to the shareholders that they cannot
fairly be held responsible for misstatements and omissions yet remaining
in solicitation materials.
Under a negligence standard, a defendant would be deemed not to
have satisfied his duty of disclosure if the proxy solicitation materials con-
tain statements which the defendant "knew or should have known were
false or misleading.' Such a standard would require directors to scrutinize
proxy materials to ascertain the truth of the statements contained therein. 8
However, it is not clear to what lengths a director would have to go under
12 See list of elements, supra note 10.
13E.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 998 (D. Del 1971).
14 E.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 856-57 (D. Del. 1972).
15 See id. at 857.
16Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
17id, at 553 n.12 and Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S: Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 865
(D. Del. 1972).
18 Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 865 (D. Del. 1972).
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this standard to assure himself of the truth of the statements, since the
phrase "should have known" does not define'the duty to know but just
assumes it.
Most courts choosing a negligence standard in rule 14a-9 actions have
not found it necessary to determine the minimal level of misconduct for
which a defendant director could be held liable because they have found
that the defendants in the cases before them actually knew of the misstate-
ments or omissions. 9 It is possible, however, that courts defining the
negligence standard in the future may read into § 14(a) the same high
standard of care (due diligence) imposed by § 11 of the Securities Act
of 193320 upon those responsible for registration statements. The court
in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.21 interpreted this § 11 "due dili-
gence" standard to require that directors have reasonable grounds to believe
in the accuracy and adequacy of the statements in the materials, and that
the statements be independently verified by the directors.22 This would
be a difficult standard for directors to meet in rule 14a-9 situations. How-
ever, one court has suggested that to avoid liability under the negligence
standard directors need only read proxy materials and correct statements
which they know or should know are erroneous or misleading, and they
need not actually "recalculate or reassemble financial or other reports ab-
sent some evident misstatement or irregularity which should be within the
director's knowledge and [which] the exercise of reasonable care would
necessitate either correcting or directing to the expert's attention."' Thus,
the burden placed on a director by the negligence standard would vary
depending on whether or not the duty of independent verification is im-
posed on directors.
As an alternative to the negligence standard in 14a-9 actions, courts
could adopt a "modified scienter standard" which would not require actual
knowledge of the omissions or misstatements in all circumstances. A vio-
lation of the duty of disclosure under such a standard would be established
by a showing of knowledge of, or gross negligence or recklessness with
respect to the false or misleading character of the misstatements or omis-
sions in the proxy materials.24  One court has already hinted, in rejecting
19 E.g., Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aft'd, 416 F.2d
1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971). In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 298 F. Supp. 66
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,983 (2d Cir. 1973), another case in
which the court decided that the negligence standard was the proper one, the court also found
that the defendants had actual knowledge of the material omissions; however, this case did not
involve the personal liability of directors.
20 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
21283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
22 See Note, False and Misleading Proxy Statements, 3 GA. L. Rev. 162, 193 (1968)
suggesting a due diligence defense of this type for actions under rule 14a-9.
23 Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 865 (D. Del. 1972).
24 Advocacy of such a modified scienter standard by the defendants was noted by the
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such a standard that it feared the standard might excuse directors from
reading proxy statements." However, such a fear would seem to be
unfounded. The failure of a director to read proxy materials would logi-
cally make the director guilty of recklessness with respect to the truth
of the matters in the materials, because he would have failed to assure
himself, before the materials were sent to shareholders, that the statements
in the materials were not untrue in the light of facts within his personal
knowledge. Another method of achieving the same result would be to
impute to individual directors as participants in the solicitation of proxies,
knowledge of any misstatements or omissions of which they would have
had knowledge had they read the proxy materials. Certainly their duty
of care under the proxy rules should require as a minimum that they read
the proxy materials.
The modified scienter standard outlined above would produce results
divergent from those under a negligence standard which does not require
independent verification in only one situation: that in which the defendant
neither knew of nor acted recklessly with respect to the false or misleading
character of misstatements or omissions, but in which he should have
known of their false or misleading character. On the other hand, a negli-
gence standard requiring independent verification of statements in proxy
materials would often produce results startingly different from those under
either a requirement of intent to defraud or deceive or a modified scienter
requirement.
While under the negligence standard the burden is on the plaintiff
to prove the defendant's knowledge or lack of reasonable care or due dili-
gence,2 6 under the modified scienter standard the burden might be put
either on the plaintiff to show the appropriate scienter or on the defendant
to show a lack of scienter. 7 Where the burden is on the defendant, his
defense has been called a "good faith defense. '2 8
court in Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D. Del. 1972). A
similar standard has been developed and employed innumerous cases dealing with § 10(b)
and rule lob-5 violations. See e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hamill & Co., 448 F.2d 442
(2d Cir. 1971); Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, (2d Cir. 1969) cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); and Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757
(D. Colo. 1964).
25In Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 867 (D. Del. 1972), the
court said that an examination of the defendants' argument that they should not be held liable
under a scienter standard since they might have relied on others to correct a statement that
they knew was false and they might not have read the final versions of the proxy statement
"demonstrates certain of the most obvious infirmities of the scienter standard."
26Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967): "Accordingly the
Court is of the view, and so charged the jury ... that plaintiffs were required only to
prove that the defendants knew or should have known of the statements and material facts .. "
27 Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970) allows suits by purchasers of
securities for "wilful" violations of the section, thus requiring plaintiffs to prove scienter;
and section 18 of the same Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970), makes good faith a complete
defense, thus putting the burden on defendants to prove their good faith. The defendants
in Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 856-58 (D. Del. 1972), contended
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The negligence standard does more than the scienter standard to ensure
that security holders will be furnished with all facts necessary to enable
them to exercise their right of corporate suffrage fairly and intelligently.
If only because it is stricter, the negligence standard puts the interest of
directors in avoiding liability more firmly in line with the interest of
shareholders in receiving complete information than does the more lenient
scienter standard. But, as will be seen later, it is questionable whether
Congress intended § 14(a) to provide shareholders with protection against
unintentional but negligent nondisclosure, and this doubt also brings into
question the propriety of the negligence standard.
III. SEARCHING FOR A STANDARD OF LIABILITY
THROUGH STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Section 14(a) contains no express provision for liability for violations
of rules and regulations implementing it. Thus Congress in drafting §
14(a), and the SEC in drafting Rule 14a-9, had no occasion expressly
to prescribe any standards of liability. The language of § 14(a) and rule
14a-9 contains no reference to either scienter or negligence, but merely
prohibits any person from violating SEC rules by including false or mis-
leading statements in proxy materials or omitting material facts from them.
The prohibition relates to the quality of the statements made and to the
sufficiency of the disclosure, and none of the words used in either § 14(a)
or rule 14a-9 contain any implications about culpability or lack of care
on the part of those soliciting proxies. The words "false" and "mislead-
ing" are neutral with respect to culpability and care. Thus, the language
provides support neither for claims that negligence is the proper standard
nor for claims that scienter is the proper one.
Although the Supreme Court has defined certain of the elements of
a cause of action under rule 14a-9,2 it has not addressed itself to the
question of the proper standard of fault. Thus, the lower federal courts
have been left to decide the appropriate standard. All of the courts that
have considered the question so far have concluded that scienter is not
required.30 However, these cases do not provide strong support for reject-
ing a scienter requirement since (1) only one of the courts considered
that by analogy the court should adopt a scienter standard with the burden of proof on
defendants if the court was not willing to make proof of scienter an affirmative part of
the plaintiffs' case.
28Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D. Il. 1970); Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 863 (D. Del. 1972).
29 In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970), the Supreme Court
gave a general explanation of the meaning of "materiality" and "causation" in 14a-9 actions.
3o Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972); Berman v.
Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D Ill. 1970); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 298 F. Supp.
66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 93,983 (2d Cir. 1973); Norte & Co. v.
Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cit. 1969), ceit.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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the question in depth"1 , (2) not all of the cases concerned the personal
liability of directors or officers,32 and (3) almost all such conclusions were
dicta. These considerations suggest that the question of the proper stan-
dard is not settled and that more attention should be devoted to it.
Since the Supreme Court has found that § 14(a) implies a private
cause of action for violations of its implementing rules, 4 it follows that
a cause of action under rule 14a-9 is statutorily created. Therefore tradi-
tional methods of statutory construction should be appropriate in the search
for the proper standard of fault. Since the language of the section is
not amenable to a "plain meaning" approach, other methods of statutory
construction must be applied, such as an examination of the legislative
history of § 14(a) and a comparison of § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 with
other sections of the 1934 Act and rules implementing the Act.
The language of § 14(a) indicates that the section was enacted primari-
ly "for the protection of investors.""3  And the question of the proper
standard of fault is directly related to the question of how much protection
Congress intended to afford shareholders in the exercise of their right of
corporate suffrage. The scope of this protection is best phrased in terms
of the evils against which Congress sought to protect shareholders, i.e.,
whether Congress intended to protect them against unintentional but neg-
ligent non-disclosure of material facts or only against knowing or reckless
nondisclosure. Consequently, in examining the legislative history of §
14(a), it is important to determine the evils against which the section was
directed, since these should provide the keys to selection of the appro-
priate standard.
Three Congressional committee reports discuss the background and
purpose of § 14(a). The first, a House committee report, states the follow-
ing about regulation of proxy solicitation:
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every
equity security bought on a public exchange. Managements of properties
owned by the investing public should not be permitted to perpetuate them-
selves by the misuse of corporate proxies. Insiders having little or no sub-
stantial interest in the properties they manage have often retained their
control without an adequate disclosure of their interest and without an
adequate explanation of the management policies they intend to pursue.
Insiders have at times solicited proxies without fairly informing the stock-
holders of the purpose for which the proxies are to be used and have used
31 Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).32 Gersde v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, CCII FED.
SEc L. REP. 5 93,983 (2d Cir. 1973), concerned the liability of the surviving corporation in
a merger.
33 See text to notes 48 through 65 infra. The conclusion in Gould v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972), may not be dictum--see text following note
59 infra.
34 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
35 See text of section 14 (a) at note 1 supra.
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such proxies to take from the stockholders for their own selfish advantage
valuable property rights. Inasmuch as only the exchanges make it possible
for securities to be widely distributed among the investing public, it fol-
lows as a corollary that the use of the exchanges should involve a corre-
sponding duty of according to shareholders fair suffrage. For this reason
the proposed bill gives the Federal Trade Commission power to control
the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to pre-
venting the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of
the voting rights of stockholders.36
The language of the report indicates that Congress was concerned with
the deliberate misuse of proxies to achieve ends which benefitted those
in control of management. The references to the purposes for which insid-
ers had misused proxies leaves no doubt that the abuses with which Con-
gress was concerned occurred in situations where the insiders had actual
knowledge of misstatements or of omissions of material facts.
The conclusion that Congress was concerned with situations in which
those soliciting proxies acted with scienter is supported by the two other
Congressional reports. The full text of the discussion of the proxy provi-
sions in one Senate report is as follows:
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the
manner in which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be en-
lightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also
as to the major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders'
meetings. Too often proxies are solicited without explanation to the stock-
holder of the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his
vote is sought. For example, in one case brought to the committee's at-
tention, proxies were solicited by the president of a corporation by means
of a letter which purported to describe certain transactions concerning
which ratification by the stockholders was sought. The letter omitted all
mention of other important details such as the previously granted secret
options in the corporation's stock, and the president's individual interest
in an underwriting agreement made by the corporation, which furnished
the real motive behind the request for ratification. The solicitation in that
case so far succeeded that not a single stockholder appeared at the meeting
in person, and an employee of the company voted all proxies in favor of
ratifying all acts and proceedings taken by the directors and officers of the
corporation. The committee recommends that the solicitation and issuance
of proxies be left to regulation by the Commission.3 7
This quotation also demonstrates Congress' concern with insiders delib-
erately concealing from shareholders the purposes for which their proxies
are being sought, or at least making no attempt to inform stockholders
of those purposes. Again, the evil sought to be eliminated is intentional
abuse of the proxy system by self-dealing directors.
3 6 H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934). Insiders are corporate officers
and directors who are also officers.
37 S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong. 2d Sess., 12 (1934).
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This same example of insider self-dealing was cited again and at more
length in a second Senate report on stock exchange practices. The section
of the report concerning proxies opens with the first two sentences of the
Senate report quoted above and then gives the details of that proxy solicita-
tion by the American Commercial Alcohol Corporation, after which the
report asserts, "The letter to the stockholders and the proxy requested the
stockholders to ratify the acts of the very officers and directors who were
betraying them by participating secretly in the underwriting agreement
and pool operation, from which they obtained substantial profits."88 Final-
ly, after excerpts from the testimony of a director involved in the fraud
and a discussion of the practice of carrying stock in brokers' names, the
report summarizes § 14 and concludes:
It is contemplated that the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission will protect investors from promiscuous solicitation of their
proxies, on the one hand, by irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest con-
trol of a corporation away from honest and conscientious corporation offi-
cials; and, on the other hand, by unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to
retain control of the management by concealing and distorting facts. 9
The language used in the report would seem to indicate that Congress'
primary concern was with those corporate officials who engage in the solici-
tation of proxies with an actual intent to deceive. Thus, all three Congres-
sional reports demonstrate concern about intentional or reckless acts by
corporate officials which deceive shareholders, rather than about good faith
attempts at disclosure in which some facts were unintentionally and un-
knowingly misstated or omitted. The modified scienter standard which
imposes liability for knowing, reckless, or grossly negligent misstatements
or omission of material facts would satisfy the concern expressed in these
reports with respect to both "unscrupulous corporate officials" and "ir-
responsible outsiders."
The legislative history of § 14(a) provides considerable support for
proponents of the modified scienter standard.4 0  However, federal courts
have thus far been reluctant to regard the legislative history as decisive
in determining the proper standard of fault.41 On the one hand, the com-
mittee reports fail to show that Congress was not concerned with negligent
misrepresentation when adopting § 14 or that Congress did not contem-
38S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess., 75 (1934).
391d. at 77.
40 There is certainly no basis in the legislative history of § 14(a) for the unsupported
assertion of one court that "[ilt is apparent from the Congressional purpose in acting Section
14(a) and from the adoption of Rule 14a-9 by the Commission, that scienter is not required
in such an action." Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 298 F. Supp. 66, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
41The court in Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 860 (D. Del.
1972), in response to the arguments of the defendants that the legislative history supported
a scienter requirement for actions under § 14 (a), asserted that "[the legislative history as
cited by the three defendants provides no significant assistance."
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plate that the SEC would proscribe negligent misrepresentations in order
better to guard against director's recklessness in regard to the accuracy
and adequacy of disclosure. Only the complete scope of the protection
intended by Congress is decisive on the question of the proper standard,
and, therefore, if the reports demonstrate only part of Congress' concern,
the legislative history cannot be the sole basis for choosing a standard. On
the other hand, the reports do indicate that Congress was confronted with
flagarant abuses of the proxy solicitation process and clearly set out to
remedy them, that the question of good faith attempts which did not fully
succeed because of unintentional but negligent misstatements or omissions
was not before Congress, and that Congress was apparently not expressly
concerned with instances of negligent nondisclosure. This note will there-
fore pursue a second method of statutory interpretation: a comparison of
§ 14(a) and rule 14a-9 with other sections of the securities laws and with
other rules.
Comparing § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 with other anti-fraud sections of
the 1934 Act does not determine the question of the proper legal standard.
It is true that the 1934 Act expressly grants a money recovery only in
instances where scienter is shown.42 But from this fact it can be argued
with equal logic that all sections of the 1934 Act should be interpreted
to require scienter, or that no other sections require scienter because Con-
gress could have specifically so provided if such had been its intention.
It might also be pointed out that there are significant similarities in lan-
guage in rule 14a-9, rule 10b-5,4a and § 17(a) (2) of the Securities Act
of 1933,"4 and that a scienter requirement has been found under both
42 See § 9 and § 18 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (1970).
43 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly... (b) To use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national secur-
ities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) -To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
44 15 U.S.C § 77q(a) (1970) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . ..
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
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§ 17 4 and rule 10b-5. 46  All three provisions prohibit untrue statements
of material facts and omissions of material facts which render misleading
the statements made. The similarity of the prohibitions and the imposition
of a scienter standard by courts in actions under rule 10b-5 and § 17
support a similar requirement for rule 14a-9 actions.
However, there are also significant differences in the language of the
three provisions which argue against making the standards the same in
all three cases. The titles of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 contain the phrase
"Manipulative and Deceptive Devices," and rule lob-5 prohibits the use
of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" as well as misstatements
and omissions of material facts. Section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 contain
only a plain prohibition against misstatements and no language relating
to intentional fraud. Sections 14, 10, and 17 also cover substantially diff-
erent areas of securities regulation, so that the standards need not be the
same under all sections. Section 10 covers the purchase and sale of securi-
ties, § 14 covers the solicitation of proxies, and § 17 covers offers or sales
of securities in which the person making the untrue statements obtains
property or money by means of the untrue statements. It is ironic that
the imposition of a negligence standard under § 14 would result in a
higher standard of care being imposed on those who solicit proxies than
on those who directly benefit from persons who invest in reliance on mis-
representations. Thus, those who are enriched by unintentional misrep-
resentations would not be held accountable, while proxy solicitors who
have not necessarily gained personally would be held to account for share-
holder losses. That this result was intended by Congress is doubtful.
The above comparisons provide no dear answer to the question whether
scienter is necessary in 14a-9 actions, since equally logical arguments result-
ing from the comparisons can be made for both positions. Consequently,
it will be necessary to turn to other means of determining the appropriate
standard of fault.
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
45 Larson v. Tony's Investments, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1969) and Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
46Many cases have construed rule lOb-5 to require a showing of scienter in suits for
damages, although the circuits are split on the issue. Cases requiring scienter are: Fischman
v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Globus v. Law Research, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hamill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d
Cir. 1971); Matheson v. White Weld, 53 F.R.D. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Pappas v. Moss, 393
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972)
(Adams, J., concurring and dissenting); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
Cases holding that proof of scienter is not necessary are: Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1962).
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IV. SETTING THE PROPER STANDARD
ON POLICY GROUNDS
A. Methods of Decision Open to Courts
Courts faced with the question of the proper standard of fault for
imposing liability on directors in 14a-9 actions have open to them several
methods of reaching a decision. They may avoid a thorough consideration
of the problem altogether by holding that absent a showing that scienter
should be required there is no reason to impose such a standard, and that
negligence is sufficient to warrant recovery. Or, alternatively, the courts
may point to the "remedial purposes" of § 14(a), emphasized in Borak,47
and to the language of § 14(a) empowering the Commissioner to adopt
regulations "for the protection of investors," and conclude that a negli-
gence standard would produce greater protection than a scienter standard.
This second method merely begs the question, since it is based on the
implicit assumption that Congress intended to provide protection against
more than intentional or reckless failure to make full disclosure in proxy
solicitation.
Preferably, however, courts will recognize that their decision is one
as to which the intent of Congress is not clear, and that the decision must
be made on policy grounds. The policy of § 14(a) puts more weight
on the side of shareholder interests than there was before the adoption
of the 1934 Act, but the courts still must consider the relative weight
of all the factors involved in determining how far to the shareholder's side
the balance has now€ shifted.
B. Methods of Decision Employed by Courts to Date
Those courts which have set a standard of fault in damage actions
under rule 14a-9 have either rejected a scienter standard or specifically
adopted a negligence standard. But in almost every case in which such
a decision was made, it was unnecessary to the disposition of the case.
Not all of the cases involved the personal liability of directors, and few
of the courts gave extensive consideration to the proper standard. Only
one court made the decision on policy grounds, and, as will be seen below,
that court failed to consider all relevant factors.
The first case to adopt negligence as the proper standard was Richland
v. Crandall.48 In a footnote to the opinion, the court remarked that §
14(a) and rule 14a-9 do not contain language associated with an intent
to defraud as do § 10(b) and rule lob-5, and concluded that plaintiffs
are not required to show an intent to defraud, but need only show negli-
47 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
48262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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gence.49 The difference in language was thus the sole basis for the court's
conclusion, and this seems to be a somewhat restrictive approach in view
of the legislative, history and the competing interests involved. However,
the conclusion was pure obiter dictum, since the court found that the proxy
statement did not in fact misstate or omit any material fact.
The same court decided Norte & Co. v. Huffines,50 an action against
corporate directors alleging, among other things, a violation of rule 14a-
9. The court mentioned only in passing that rule 14a-9 actions do not
require a showing of actual knowledge, but provided no discussion support-
ing that statement of law because the court found that the defendants
had had actual knowledge of the misstatements and omissions. 1
The court in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,52 also decided that negli-
gence is sufficient to warrant recovery in 14a-9 actions. The court pointed
out that it had adopted a scienter requirement in 10b-5 actions in order
to avoid having different remedies for the same offense under § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act and §§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act.' It implied
that no similar problem existed with regard to rule 14a-9. Additionally,
the court noted that a literal reading of § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 does
not reveal any scienter requirement,54 and asserted without elaboration,
"It is apparent from the Congressional purpose in enacting Section 14(a)
and from the adoption of Rule 14a-9 by the Commission, that scienter
is not required in such an action." 55  But the court did not discuss the
possibility that other relevant factors56 might well outweigh these reasons
thus requiring scienter as a more advisable standard than negligence.
However, Gerstle did not involve the personal liability of directors, and
the court's conclusion that negligence is a sufficient basis for liability is
dictum here too, because the court found that Skogmo's nondisclosure of
certain material facts was intentional.57 Moreover, in affirming the lower
court's decision the Second Circuit did not extend the application of negli-
gence as the proper standard to cases beyond those in which the defendant
participated in. the preparation of the proxy statement and was the bene-
ficiary of the proxy vote.5 8
In Betman v. Thomson,59 the court, in effect, assumed the answer
491d. at 553 n.12.
50 304 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
51 Id. at 1109-10.
52298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,983 (2d Cir. 1973).
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1970).
54 298 F. Supp. at 97.
55Id. at 101.
56 See text accompanying notes 66-90 infra.
57298 F. Supp. at 101.
58 Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,983 (2d Cir. 1973).
59 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. I1. 1970).
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to the question of the proper standard by holding that recognition of a
good faith defense would not further the statutory policy of full disclo-
sure.60 The court's reliance on the statutory policy of full disclosure in-
volved an assumption that Congress intended to protect investors against
non-reckless, unintentional nondisclosure, an assumption which does not
find express support in the legislative history of § 14(a).
The one case which does attempt a consideration of policy grounds
is Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. 1 On a motion to vacate
the partial summary judgment which had been granted on the issue of
the liability of several directors, Judge Wright had plaintiffs and defen-
dants submit memoranda on the issue of the proper standard of fault.
In his opinion denying the motion, he considered the language of the stat-
ute, the legislative history of the section, the policies behind the 1934 Act,
the importance of informed corporate suffrage, the position of directors
in corporations, and the effect of the various standards in promoting full
disclosure.
Judge Wright rejected a standard of absolute liability because he be-
lieved it would create serious practical problems for directors and would
not fulfill other purposes of the securities acts. The court's main point
was that strict liability would provide persons more incentive not to be-
come directors than to accept positions as directors and the concomittant
responsibility to scrutinize proxy materials especially when efforts at active
and rigorous scrutiny would be of no significance in precluding liability
for misstatements again.st which a director cannot reasonably guard.62
In choosing a negligence standard Judge Wright stressed the following
factors: dicta in other decisions that scienter is not essential to a § 14(a)
action, the importance of corporate suffrage, the importance of adequately
informed stockholders, the limited scope of § 14(a), the position of fidu-
ciary trust which directors occupy in relation to potential plaintiffs (share-
holders), and the incentive which a standard of reasonable care gives to
directors to scrutinize proxy materials and guard against liability.63
It is not clear whether the Gould court's choice of the negligence stan-
dard was dictum or not. The decision denied the motion to vacate but re-
liance on a modified scienter standard would not have required a different
result because the court had previously determined that the defendants
against whom summary judgment was granted had known of the mis-
statements and omissions. 4 But the negligence standard, once chosen,
601d. at 1035.
61351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).
621d. at 859.
31d. at 864-65.
64331 F. Supp. at 998.
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would necessarily be applied to the other defendants against whom sum-
mary judgment had not been granted. 5
Because of its consideration of factors that other courts have passed
over, the Gould decision is the most significant of all opinions on the
proper standard of fault. However, the decision may be criticized because
it did not consider, or at least did not discuss, other equally important fac-
tors which might have changed the result.
C. Factors Which Courts Have Failed to Consider
The fact that damages in rule 14a-9 suits may be enormous, wholly
dependent on market movements and unrelated to any possible unjust en-
richment of directors "6 should cause courts to pause before they subject
directors to liability under a strict negligence standard. In Gould the de-
fendant directors were faced with the possibility of being held liable for
damages in the astronomical sum of $24 million.6 7  The expanding litiga-
tion under the securities laws in recent years has already created an atmo-
sphere of uneasiness and uncertainty among corporate officials, and the
adoption of a negligence standard for imposing liability on directors for
such large amounts in 14a-9 actions can only increase that uneasiness. One
commentator has written that the atmosphere of uncertainty created by
the highly publicized federal securities law decisions of the 1960's even
caused some persons to resign their outside directorships.6 8 Furthermore,
65 351 F. Supp. at 857 n.3.
66In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 298 F. Supp. 66, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), the district
court held that accounting and restitution were the proper remedies for the plaintiffs and
decreed:
After proper deduction for Skogmo's proportionate interest in General's assets as of
the date of the merger, plaintiffs are entitled to the highest value since the date of
the merger of all the assets transferred to Skogmo by General including post-merger
appreciation of said assets less (i) Skogmo's proportionate share thereof, and (ii) the
value of Skogmo stock as of the date of the merger received by those shareholders who
have exchanged their shares or to be received by those who have not yet exchanged
their shares.
Although defendant Skogmo Corp. was actually enriched by the merger and thus was only
forced to return what it had gotten by illicit means, when directors are defendants in 14a-9
suits and the challenged transaction is a merger, the surviving corporation rather than the
directors of the disappearing corporation, would have received any benefit from the violations
of rule 14a-9. In such a situation, the measure of damages which the defendant directors
would be liable to pay to plaintiffs would still be measured either as in Gerstle or computed
according to what the correct stock exchange ratio of surviving corporation stock for disappearing
corporation stock should have been because the loss to the plaintiffs in the transaction would
be the same no matter who the defendant is and no matter who benefitted from the transaction.
Thus what the directors would have to pay, if damages are computed as in Gerstle, would
be dependent on changes in the market value of the assets of the non-surviving corporation
from the date of the merger to the date of the judgment. These changes could be substantial
considering the potentially long span of time between the challenged transaction and the
final judgment.
6 7 Memorandum of Defendants Ludwig and Kroeger at 22, Gould v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).
6 8 Johnston, Developing a Protection Program for Corporate Directors and Officers, 26
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the spectre of enormous damage judgments can hamper effective decision-
making by corporate officers and directors. This possibility was recognized
by the Internal Revenue Service when it issued a revenue ruling allowing
premiums paid by corporations for director and officer liability insurance
to be deducted as a business expense on the theory that the corporation
receives the primary benefit from such insurance, because insurance allows
officers and directors to make necessary corporate decisions without fear
of legal entanglementP6
Since some men who were already directors have been so alarmed by
the possibility of enormous judgments that they have resigned director-
ships, courts should be aware that a negligence standard would tend to
scare off other capable men from accepting directorships. In 1969 the
Wall Street Journal reported that: "[S]cores of men are politely declining
offers they once would have jumped at to serve on prestigious boards.
. .There now is a real shortage of competent men willing and able
to serve as directors." 7 It is doubtful that the interests of investors would
be served by a negligence standard that would scare off responsible, compe-
tent men from accepting the responsibility of managing the corporations
in which shareholders' money is invested.
Courts should also be conscious that the extension of liability under
a negligence standard is not necessary to cover morally blameworthy ac-
tions of directors. In situations where self-dealing or unjust enrichment
is present, as in Norte & Co. v. Huffines,'71 a scienter standard would pro-
vide adequate relief to the injured parties. It can also be argued that,
unlike intentional deception or recklessness, negligence does not involve
sufficient moral blameworthiness to justify holding directors liable for
the omission of material facts from proxy statements.
Courts should also consider the present relative inability of directors
to spread the cost of judgments recovered against them for 14a-9 viola-
tions. If it were possible for directors to spread judgment costs through
corporate indemnification and liability insurance, holding directors to a
standard as strict as a negligence standard would be much more justifiable
than at present. Nearly all states have statutes relating to the indemnifica-
tion of corporate directors and officers, some requiring indemnification un-
der certain circumstances,72 some merely allowing indemnification, m and
some requiring court approval.7 4 However, most state laws do not permit
Bus. LAW. 445 (1970). Outside directors are those directors who are not also corporate
officers. See text accompanying notes 82 and 83 infra.
6 9 Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 Cum Bull. 22.
70TWaIl Street Journal, March 13, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
71See notes 50-il supra, and accompanying text.
72 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145 (c) (West Cum. Supp. 1968).
73 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145 (a) (West Cum. Supp. 1968); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 1701.13(E) (Page 1964); KY. REV. STAT. § 271A.025(1) (Baldwin 1969).
7"E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West 1955).
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corporations to indemnify a director in either a, derivative or third party
action in which the director is found liable for negligence or misconduct
in the performance of his duties. 5 Thus, in most cases in which a director
would be found liable under a negligence standard indemnification would
not be available.76  Moreover, many times when the directors are sued
instead of the corporation, it is because the corporation is either no longer
in existence or is insolvent, making it impossible for the directors to receive
indemnification from the corporation. Therefore, unless directors have in-
surance covering such liability, they would have to bear the expense of
damage judgments alone. If indemnification were more readily available,
it would encourage men to accept the responsibility of directorships by
bringing the risk of loss under the negligence standard into a better balance
with the rewards of the post.77
Insurance covering the liability of corporations and corporate officers
and directors is available, but it is very expensive and only a minority
of all applicants receive coverage,7 8 which means that an even smaller
minority of all corporate directors are covered by such insurance. Such
insurance policies do not ordinarily cover outright fraud or intentional
wrongdoing or losses caused by the dishonesty of the insured.7O These
exclusions and the amounts deductible from coverage on each claim for
each insured and for the corporation (generally $5,000 to $100,000 plus
5% of losses above this amount80 ) keep the insurance from being a com-
plete insulation against liability and thus preserve the incentive for direc-
tors to avoid misstatements and omissions.
If indemnification and liability insurance were more readily available
for coverage of 14a-9 judgments, they would permit a wider distribution
of the losses under a negligence standard. The premiums for such insur-
ance are deductible to the corporation as business expenses,"' and the
same principle should apply to amounts spent by corporations to indemnify
directors for expenses and judgments in securities actions. Thus, the bur-
75 Note, Indemnification of the Corporate Insider: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance,
54 MINN. L. REv. 667, 674 (1970). E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (E) (Page
1964).
76 However, statutes such as DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (a) (West Cum. Supp. 1968)
and KY. REV. STAT. § 271A.25(1) (Baldwin 1969), which follow Section 5 of the Model
Business Corporation Act, promulgated by the American Bar Association and the American
Law Institute in 1967, do allow a corporation to indemnify a director or officer against expenses
(including attorney's fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement reasonably incurred
in the suit if the director acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to
be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.
Tt
KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECrORs (1973 ed.), § 16.01,
at 406.
78In 1969 it was estimated that only 25% of all applicants received coverage. Id. § 17.07,
at 440-41.
79 Id. § 17.01, at 430.
80 Id. § 17.06, at 438, § 17.12, at 450.
8 1 Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 22.
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den of director liability would be spread over all insured corporations and
directors, over the United States Treasury (by means of the deduction for
premiums as business expenses), over the individual directors who have to
pty part of the premiums and part of the judgments, and ultimately over
all shareholders of the corporations in the form of reduced dividends.
If a director could receive insurance coverage or be eligible for indem-
nification from his corporation, the prospect of his being held liable under
a negligence standard would not appear so devastating to him. Yet it
would still be a deterrent to negligent acts because of the deductible
amounts not covered by the policy. Thus, competent men would not be
as frightened by the negligence standard as they would be if they had to
bear the judgment costs alone. However, the present relative unavailabil-
ity of insurance and indemnification and the resulting inability of directors
to spread the costs of judgments in 14a-9 actions make the exposure to
liability under the negligence standard a heavy burden. A recognition of
the hardship which the negligence standard places upon directors, and of
the consequent detrimental effects to corporations and to investors' in-
terests from the resulting shortage of competent directors, should indicate
to courts the need to adopt a modified scienter requirement in rule 14a-9
actions.
D. The Advisability of a Modified Scienter Standard
for Outside, Nbn-involved Dh'ectors
Not all directors are equally involved in corporate affairs. "Inside"
directors, who are corporation executives as well as directors, manage the
business of the corporation, while their "outside" counterparts who are
not corporate officers, "spend most or all of their working time in another
business, but lend their management skills and judgment to provide a fresh
outlook on the business that might be somewhat more parochial if only
full-time employees of the companies were on the board." 2 Outside direc-
tors often sit on boards because they represent public interest groups or
large stockholders or because of the prestige they have achieved in other
fields."'
The considerations set out in the preceding section argue with partic-
ular force for a modified scienter standard in the case of outside directors
who were not involved in planning the transactions to which misstatements
or omissions in the proxy materials relate. It would be especially unfair
to hold such directors to a negligence standard of the "due diligence" type,
which requires that a director have reasonable grounds to believe in the
82 Securities Regulation and Transfer Report, April 20, 1973, at 2.
83Address by SEC Chairman Cook, April 6, 1973, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 79,302 at
p. 82,917.
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accuracy and adequacy of the proxy material and independently verify the
statements in the materials.84
An outside, non-involved director has less opportunity to gain informa-
tion about the details of corporate activity in general and about specific
transactions (such as mergers) treated in proxy statements than do inside
and involved directors. Thus, an outside, non-involved director is not in
a good position to know the truth and adequacy of statements in proxy
materials. Then SEC Chairman G. Bradford Cook recently criticized some
courts for not giving due consideration to "the fact that outside directors
of companies often are effectively blocked by inside directors from getting
vital information to make informed judgments on corporate affairs." 85
Mr. Cook said that outside directors can contribute to today's heightened
sense of corporate social responsibility,86 but that courts which have held
outside directors to the same standards of diligence as the inside directors
have placed an intolerable burden on them which will deter good men
from serving as outside directors.8 ' Considering the fact that outside direc-
tors usually come to the position with little technical expertise, he said,
the automatic imposition of broad liability on all persons bearing the title
of director is clearly not in the public interest. 8
To be sure, it is not too much to require an outside director to read
the proxy material and correct any misstatements or omissions oftfacts
within his knowledge. But to require him to verify independently all
statements made in such materials by testing them against facts which
might not be known to him, would be, in the words of Judge Learned
Hand, "practically to charge him with detailed supervision of the business,
which, if consistently carried out, would have taken most of his time. If
a director must go so far as that, there will be no directors."'  Judge
Hand's remarks were made in reference to a suit against an outside, non-
involved director based on his company's use of a circular to sell stock
in the company. The claim in the case, Barnes v. Andrews, 0 was based
on New York corporation law, but Judge Hand's remarks are equally appli-
cable to outside directors facing liability in rule 14a-9 actions.
To require outside, non-involved directors to verify independently the
proxy statements prepared by highly qualified lawyers, brokers and accoun-
tants would be to require them either to become so totally involved in
84 See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
85 Address by SEC Chairman Cook, April 6, 1973, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 79,302 at
p. 82,919.
86 Id. at 82,917.
87 Id. at 82,916.
88 Id. at 82,917. Mr. Cook also said that the SEC plans to issue soon a position paper on
the standards which directors must adhere to in order to discharge their obligations under the
securities laws. However, Mr. Cook is no longer SEC Chairman.
8 9 Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
9O Id,
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corporate affairs that they lose their status as outside directors or to become
insurers of the accuracy and adequacy of proxy statements prepared by
others. No outside director could afford to open himself to the risk created
by the second choice. Thus, subjecting outside directors to a due diligence
standard could effectively eliminate such directors from corporate boards,
depriving the corporation and the corporate management of their detached
and critical insight into the affairs of the corporation. To avoid such a
loss to corporations and their shareholders, courts should at least adopt
a modified scienter standard for outside, non-involved directors. Such a
standard would protect investors by holding outside directors to a mini-
mum duty of reading proxy materials and correcting inadequacies and inac-
curacies within their knowledge but would not impose too great a burden
on outside directors. Choosing this standard for outside directors would,
of course, not preclude courts that were so inclined from imposing a higher
standard on corporate officers and directors actually involved in the transac-
tions to which the proxy materials relate, or on those officers and directors
actually involved in the preparation of the proxy materials.
V. CONCLUSION
The policy of § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 is to ensure that security holders
be furnished with the opportunity of intelligently and fairly exercising their
right of corporate suffrage. But the language of the section and of the
rule does not disclose the standard of fault required for imposition of liabil-
ity. Although the legislative history of § 14(a) may not be determinative
of the question, it does suggest that Congress enacted § 14(a) to guard
against intentional or reckless misrepresentations or omissions of material
facts. However, lower federal courts unwilling to rely on legislative his-
tory may prefer to handle the problem strictly in terms of policy considera-
tions. Among the factors which should be weighed in reaching a decision
are: the effect of the imposition of a negligence standard on the willingness
of competent men to accept the responsibility of directorships, the enormity
of possible damages in situations in which directors lack moral blame-
worthiness, and the present inability of directors to spread the cost of judg-
ments by means of liability insurance and corporate indemnification.
These factors make advisable a modified scienter standard for directors
and militate strongly for such a standard in the case of outside, non-in-
volved directors.
Stephen Robert Sehmidt
